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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JAMES E. REED, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-v.-
HEPBURN T.AR~1STRONG, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8612 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
RESTATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of facts as set forth by appellant is 
correct, but incomplete. Respondent desires to set forth 
additional pertinent facts. 
Appellant sued for the value of 67,000 shares of com-
mon stock of Wyoming Uranium Corporation. Under 
Exhibit A, a Contract dated July 14, 1954, set forth in 
appellant's Brief at pages 2 and 3 thereof, re.spondent 
received from appellant $2000.00 of which $1000.00 was 
to be utilized to obtain A.E.C. certification of certain 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
m1nmg claims, and in the event legislation should be 
passed making such certification unnecessary the $1000.00 
would be returned to appellant. Respondent agreed to 
incorporate the Wyoming Uranium Corporation .and to 
give to appellant 134,000 shares of the capital stock there-
of for the $2000.00 paid by appellant to respondent, 
provided, however, that in the event the aforesaid 
$1000.00 was returned to appellant within ten days from 
the date of the Agreement, appellant should receive 
67,000 shares only. 
Almost immediately after July 14, 1954, respondent 
learned that A.E.C. certification would not be necessary, 
and he informed plaintiff of that fact, and that the 
$1000.00 would be returned to plaintiff although it might 
not be within ten days. The Court found that plaintiff 
by oral agreement abrogated the ten-day condition and 
permitted the $1000.00 to be returned within a reason-
able time, and that the same was returned within a 
reasonable time and plaintiff .agreed to accept 66,666 
share.s instead of 134,000 and that the agreement was 
executed by plaintiff and defendant. 
On the 29th of July, 1954, almost immediately after 
the aforesaid oral agreement appellant gave respondent 
a check for $1500.00 on the back thereof over signature 
of endorsmnent of respondent appears: 
"Payment of $1500.00 or part thereof as needed 
for 100,000 shares of stock in proposed \Vyoming 
Uranium Company enlarges agreen1ent of July 
14, 1954." 
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... 
It is stipulated that the 100,000 shares of stock for 
which appellant paid $1500.00 on July 29, 1954, has been 
delivered and 66,666 shares of stock have been delivered 
under the agreement of July 14, 1954. 
Appellant's action is to recover the value of 67,000 
shares which he claims is due to him under the Contract 
of July 1 ±, 1954, because the $1000.00 which was returned 
to appellant approximately forty-five days after receipt 
thereof was not returned within ten days. 
The cause was tried upon appellant's complaint and 
respondent's Second Amended Answer. By his answer 
respondent alleged that the provision that 134,000 shares 
would be delivered to appellant under the Agreement of 
July 14, 1954, instead of 67,000 shares, in the event 
$1000.00 was not returned within ten days, constituted 
an agreement for a penalty and was void and unenforce-
able as to the difference between 134,000 and 67,000 
shares. The Court so found (R. 76). 
As a Third Affirmative Defense respondent alleged 
that during the months of March, 1955, and November, 
1955, respondent delivered the stock agreed to be de-
livered under the Agreements of July 14, 1954, and July 
29, 1954, in the amount of 166,666 shares, and the same 
were accepted by appellant, and appellant waived claim 
to any additional shares of the capital stock of Wyoming 
Uranium Corporation. In the findings and judgment 
the Court failed to find on this issue, although in his oral 
order for judgment the Court found that the agreement 
for acceptance of 166,666 shares was executed. 
Appellant is an Investn1ent Dealer and acted .as 
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Underwriter for Wyoming Uranium Corporation in the 
sale of 9,166,666 shares of said corporation's common 
stock. As such Underwriter he was required to furnish 
to each purchaser an Offering Circular. An Offering 
Circular must set forth all pre-organization stock. 
The offering Circular for Wyoming tTranium Cor-
poration was prepared by C. Allen Elggren (R. 34-35). 
Counsel for respondent read to appellant the fol-
lowing from the Offering Circular: 
"At the completion of the offering 1,500,00 shares 
that would be held by the promoters will represent 
13.8o/o of the outstanding stock; the 166,667 shares 
held by Dr. Reed P. Larson for which he paid 
$2500.00 will represent 1.5% of the outstanding 
stock." 
and asked if he, the appellant, knew what was in the 
circular, to which he answered: "Certainly" (R. 64). 
When respondent first went to appellant to solicit 
pre-organization money, appellant told respondent that 
he would obtain the money from a potential investor, 
Reed P. Larson, and that same day he went to the office 
of Reed P. Larson, which was in the srune building as the 
office of appellant (R. 50). Appellant was asked why 
his name was not included in the Offering Circular as 
being entitled to any pre-organization stock. He an-
~'vered it was the suggestion of :Mr. Elggren that it 
would be better not to haYe an lTnderwriter shown as 
having received pre-organization stork (R. 56). Thus 
the stoek C'lairned by appellant was shown in the Offering 
( ~ircular as belonging to a client of appellant, Dr. Reed 
P. Larson. 
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The stock purchased under the Contract of July 
14, 1954, and the check of July 29, 1954, were the only 
transactions in which Reed and Larson were involved 
jointly with Wyoming Uranium Corpor.ation (R. 63). 
Objections were sustained to questions asked Mr. 
Elggren concerning his discussion with appellant con-
cerning the number of shares of pre-organization stock 
which he or Reed P. Larson were entitled to. The Court 
sustained the objections on the ground that the com-
munications between 11r. Elggren ·and Mr. Reed were 
confidential, and that he was acting for ,appellant as well 
as Wyoming Uranium Corporation in the preparation 
of the Offering Circular. 
The following offer of proof was made by respondent 
and refused by the Court : 
"I offer to prove by this witness both in con-
nection with this and the other objections which 
have been sustained to my questions, that this 
witness, if permitted to ,answer, would testify 
he discussed these matters with Mr. Reed and that, 
Mr. Reed told him that the stock to which he was 
entitled, to which he and Mr. Larson together 
were entitled was 166,666 .shares, and that the 
same should be noted in the Offering Circular 
and in the name of Mr. Larson, and that the 
166,666 shares mentioned therein is the stock 
to which Mr. Reed, or :Mr. Reed and Mr. Larson 
together would be. entitled under the agreement, 
and the check, whiCh have heretofore been intro-
duced in this matter." (R. 39) 
Respondent testified that during the ten-day period 
following the execution of the Agreement of July 14, 
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1954, he had received the information that the A.E.C. 
Mineral Leasing Act was going out. That on July 27th 
or 28th respondent returned to Salt Lake City and talked 
to appellant and informed him that the $1000.00 received 
for A.E.C. certification would not be used, but would be 
returned to .appellant, but that even though he wouldn't 
need the money for leases he could use more money for 
land operations. He stated they agreed to modify the 
original agreernent and for the $1000.00 which had been 
paid to him appellant would get stock for a penny and 
a half per share, that is, 66,000 shares of stock, and that 
he would not receive any stock for the $1000.00 that had 
been sent to the A.E.C., and which would soon be returned 
to him, but that appellant would, however, give to re-
spondent an additional $1500.00 for which he would get 
another 100,000 shares of stock, which would make 166,-
000 shares of stock (R. 47). 
Respondent stated: 
"The $1,000.00, if they didn't use it for leases, 
he got his money back, he got 66,000 shares for 
the original $1000.00 I took to Lander and for 
this fifteen hundred he got an additional 100,000 
and that is 166,000 share.s, that is what I under-
stood at the time, .and what I understood until 
a year and a half later, that is what we put in 
the Offering Circular, and the stock then was 
3c a share, and it wasn't until a year .and a half 
later when the stock went up to 20c a share he 
said he would hold me to that ten days clause in 
there.'' (R. 47) 
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ARGU~IENT 
Appellant argues his case under three points: 
"I. The Trial Court erred in its ruling that 
Clause B. of plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 constitutes 
a penalty and is unenforceable. 
"II. The Trial Court erred in its admission 
of parol evidence to vary the terms of written 
contracts, plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1 and No. 2. 
"III. The Trial Court erred in permitting 
defendant to reduce his contractual obligation 
without consideration." 
It is the position of respondent that the Court did 
not err in any of the three particulars relied upon by 
appellant. In addition respondent submits that the Court 
erred in excluding the testimony of C. Allen Elggren 
and in failing to enter a finding to the effect that the 
oral agreement of appellant to accept 166,666 shares 
was fully executed, although the Court did make such 
finding in his oral decision. Respondent is, therefore, 
presenting his case under six points: 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULING 
THAT CLAUSE B OF PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. I CON-
STITUTES A PENALTY AND IS UNENFORCEABLE. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING 
PAROL EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATION OF 
THE WRITTEN CONTRACT OF JULY 14, 1954. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
RESPONDENT TO REDUCE A ·CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA-
TION WITHOUT CONSIDERATION. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PER-
MIT MR. ELGGREN TO TESTIFY AS TO CONVERSATIONS 
WITH APPELLANT ·CONCERNING STATEMENTS MADE 
IN THE OFFERING CIRCULAR RELATIVE TO PRE-OR-
GANIZATION STOCK TO WHICH APPELLANT OR REED 
P. LARSON WERE ENTITLED. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER 
A FINDING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ORAL AGREE-
MENT OF APPELLANT TO ACCEPT 166,666 SHARES WAS 
FULLY EXE·CUTED. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER 
A FINDING TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT DE-
LIVERED 166,666 SHARES TO APPELLANT WHICH HE 
ACCEPTED AND WAIVED CLAIM TO ANY ADDITIONAL 
SHARES. 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULING 
THAT CLAUSE B OF PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. I CON-
STITUTES A PENALTY AND IS UNENFORCEABLE. 
Appellant's argument in effect is that the contract 
provides for a return of 67,000 shares of stock upon the 
happening of a condition subsequent, and is not a con-
tract for a forfeiture or penalty. The gist of appellant's 
argu1nent on this point is found in the last two para-
graphs of his argu1nent under his Point I on page 9 as 
follows: 
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"The condition subsequent that would entitle de-
fendant to receive back 67,000 shares was beyond 
the control of either party. Defendant had no-
thing to perform, .and no control over the con-
dition and both parties knew of this and con-
tracted in relation to it. 
"It is respectfully urged that the legal relation-
ship established was not for penalty. It may have 
been otherwise, if defendant had agreed to con-
vey 67,000 shares, only, plus an additional 67,000 
shares if he did not return the money in ten ( 10) 
days. Such is not the case and the agreement 
clearly shows such was not the intent." 
Appellant is wrong is his statement that respond-
ent had nothing to perform and no control over the con-
dition. Respondent could have returned the $1000.00 
·the next day and eliminated any claim of appellant to 
the 67,000 shares in question. The form of the contract 
is not controlling, if in fact it provides for a forfeiture 
or a penalty. The nature of forfeitures and penalties 
is discussed at length in Williston on Contracts, Chapter 
28, Vol. 3, pages 2169 to 2285, under the title "Excuse 
of Conditions and Promises vVhich vVould Cause a For-
feiture or Penalty." 
The following is from 3 Williston on Contracts, Sec-
tion 769, page 2170: 
"Though the law cannot create contractual ob-
ligations which were not based on the expressed 
intention of the parties, it can excuse the per-
formance either of conditions or promises agreed 
upon by the parties for any reasons which seem 
to be just. The mere fact that a promise or con-
dition is somewhat harsh or unfair in its opera-
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tion is not enough to furnish such an excuse, but 
a principle of somewhat vague boundaries pro-
hibits the enforcement of forfeitures and penal-
ties. Though these two words are often used as 
synonyms, the word 'forfeiture' carries the im-
plication of deprivation of something previously 
owned as distinguished from subjection to a 
liability, but the distinction is often blurred." 
In the case at bar respondent is in effect deprived 
of property which he owned, if he is required to give 
the additional 67,000 shares of stock to appellant. As 
owner of the uranium claims which he agreed to convey 
to the corporation and receive stock in exchange therefor, 
he is in effect by giving stock being deprived of the 
value of .so much of his mining claims .as would be repre-
sented by the additional 67,000 shares of stock. 
Under the section heading: "The Form of the Con-
tract Cannot Make a Penalty Enforceable," Williston on 
Contracts, Section 782, page 2198, the author says: 
"Numerous attempts have been made to achieve 
the desired result of malting a penal sum re-
coverable in case of the nonperformance of a 
contract. If the question were wholly one of 
interpretation, such attempts would never be suc-
cessful. It is not difficult to make clear beyond 
dispute that recovery of any amount nruned w.as 
contemplated and was intended if the promisor 
failed to fulfil his priinary undertaking or any 
perforrnance nruned as an alternatiYe ~ but though 
the decisions are not wholly uniforrn principle 
and authority both justify the statement at the 
heading of this section." 
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The following is from 3 Williston on Contracts, Sec-
tion 777, page 2185: 
"Therefore, the first step toward a clear under-
standing of the matter, is to recognize that 
the determination of whether a particular pro-
vision is penal or merely provides for liquidated 
damages only, does not depend on the natural 
meaning of the language used by the parties. The 
leg.al effect of an instrument depends on rules 
of law which sometimes contradict the meaning 
of the instrument and the intention of the parties. 
Probably all that most courts mean-at any rate 
all that can be defended-is to say that the valid-
ity of the stipulation is to be 'judged of as at the 
time of the making of the contract not as at the 
time of the breach,' and this is undoubtedly true." 
At Section 778, page 2190, of the same work, the au-
thor states: 
"Intention of the parties is a misleading and 
undesirable designation for this requirement and 
the first step toward clearing the confusion of 
the law on the subject is to drop the use of the 
phrase from the discussion. Even the suggested 
substitute of an inquiry \Yhether the p.artie.s in 
good faith attempted to estimate the real injury 
is a somewhat artificial cloak for the true prin-
ciple, for the only evidence that the court ever 
has before it bearing on the issue is whether the 
parties in good faith made such an estimate, 
beside their statement in the contract, that the 
sum named is liquidated damage.s or a penalty, 
(and to this, as has been seen, the court rightly 
pays little attention), is the reasonableness in fact 
of the amount; and the matter would be much 
simplified if it were clearly recognized and stated 
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that the reasonableness of the agreed sum looked 
at as of the time when the contract was made is 
the only important thing." 
In Section 779, page 2190, of the same work the au-
thor states: 
"In spite of the language of cases regarding 
the intention of the parties, there is little doubt 
that .a sum named as liquidated damages in order 
to give effect must be reasonable in amount." 
This Court has adopted the same rule in a number 
of cases including: 
Bramwell Inv. Co. v. U ggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 P.(2) 
913, 916. 
Dopp v. Richards, 43 Utah 332, 135 P. 98. 
Thomas v. Foulger, 71 Utah 274, 264 P. 975. 
Croft v. Jensen, 40 P.(2) 198,f(Utah iJ_. 
In the last cited case, Croft v. Jensen, the Court held 
that calling a sum to be paid under a contract liquidated 
or stipulated damages will not prevent the court from 
treating it as a penalty. 
An interesting case cited and discussed at length 
by Williston in his treatise on Contracts to the point 
that the form of the contract is not controlling is May-
bury v. Spinney Maybury Co., 122 l\Ie. -±22, 120 Atl. 611. 
In that case a contract was rnade for the lease of certain 
rnachinery which provided for the payrnent on the last 
day of each c.alendar rnonth of fixed rentals or royalties 
accruing for the use of the rnachines during that month. 
The contract provided that in all cases where lessee 
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should pay to lessor on or before the 15th day of the 
calendar rnonth the rent or royalty for the next preced-
ing calendar month, lessor would in consideration of 
such prompt payment grant a discount of fifty per cent 
of such rent or royalty due for such preceding calendar 
month. The Court held that although the contract de-
nominated the difference between the larger and the 
smaller as a discount and had phrased the contract in 
terms appropriate to a discount, the Court was not pre-
cluded from seeking the intent of the parties to deter-
mine whether the smaller anwunt was in fact the actual 
debt and the larger sum was a penalty and that the only 
amount owing was the smaller .amount even though pay-
ment was not rnade promptly within the fifteen days. 
In the case at bar had the phrase "within ten days" 
been omitted there could be no question that the appellant 
would not be entitled to the additional 67,000 shares 
of stock. Thus, it .appears that if the contract is enforced, 
respondent forfeits 66,666 shares of stock contracted at 
the time at l¥2c a share, or a value of $1000.00, for 
thirty or thirty-five days delay in returning $1000.00. 
As is generally held, the damages for such delay would 
be reasonable interest. Interest at 6% per annum for 
.a month and a half would amount to $7.50. Thus it ap-
pears that the stipulated penalty in this case of $1000.00 
worth of stock, 66,666 shares, is for a delay which could 
not damage appellant more than $7.50. 
Thus, respondent repeats as stated in Section 779, 
page 2191, of Williston on Contracts: 
"In spite of the language of cases regarding 
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the intention of the parties, there is little doubt 
that a sum named as liquidated damages in order 
to be given effect must be reasonable in amount 
.... This is but saying, that the reasonableness 
or unreasonableness of the stipulation is decis-
ive." 
Re.spondent submits that the Court did not err in 
its finding that the agre,ement to give an additional 
$1000.00 worth of stock if the $1000.00 was not returned 
in ten days provides for a penalty or forfeiture and is 
unenforceable. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING 
PAROL EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATION OF 
THE WRITTEN CONTRA!CT OF JULY 14, 1954. 
Written contracts may be modified by parol agree-
ments. 17 C. J. S. Section 373, page 857. 
As stated in Smith v. Washburn, 54 Ida. 659, 34 Pac. 
(2d) 969: 
"It is the general rule of law that p.arties to 
an unperformed contract 1nay, by mutual con-
sent, modify it by altering, excising and adding 
provisions, and such modification may be by 
parol agree1nent though the contract is in writ-
ing." 
The Court found that appellant consented to the 
1nodification to provide that for the $1000.00 which would 
be returned in a reasonable ti1ne no stock would be given. 
The essence of nwdification in this case is merely an ex-
tension fr01n ten days to a reasonable tin1e within which 
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to return the $1000.00. As stated in 17 C.J.S., Section 
506, page 1080: 
"The time for performance of ,a written contract 
may be waived by parol," citing Opjon v. Engebo, 
73 Wash. 324, 131 Pac. 1146. 
In Parker v. Weber County Irr. Co., 65 Utah 354, 
236 Pac. 1105, this Court held that a written instrument 
may be modified by a subsequent parol agreement. 
Appellant in his Brief at page 10 and 11 cites Verdi 
v. Helper State Bank, 196 Pac. 225, to the point that a 
written certificate of deposit could not be modified by 
parol agreement. In that case the Court stated at page 
228: 
"Whether there was a modification of the terms 
of the certificate respecting the payment of in-
terest or whether a new agreement was entered 
into whereby the bank agreed to pay the interest, 
is .a question of fact upon which we express no 
opinion. Moreover, the evidence in that regard 
must be limited to the allegations of the com-
plaint." 
A reading of that ca.se will disclose that the Court 
did not hold that a written certificate of deposit could 
not be subsequently 1nodified by an oral agreement. 
If .appellant is arguing that the writt·en contract of 
,July 14, 1954, cannot be modified by parol because the 
parol agreement was embodied in the agreement on the 
back of the check, the answer of respondent to that 
proposition is that the statement on the back of the 
check is not a complete contract, did not integrate the 
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agreements of the parties, and, therefore, the oral agree-
ment is admissible. 
On this matter McCormick on Evidence at page 431, 
in discussing whether a memorandum purports to be a 
complete writing, and, therefore, would bar parol agree-
ment, the author states: 
('The writing is still the sole criterion by which 
to determine whether it is 'complete,' but it is 
the writing considered in the light of all the sur-
rounding circumstances. All, that is, except one. 
You may consider the 'entire situation leading up 
to the signing of the writing except the most 
crucial of all data, i.e., the purport of the alleged 
agreement which has been left out of the writing.~' 
The author goes on to discuss the proposition that 
it is for the judge to control the admission of such evi-
dence, .and at page 435) quoting from Wigmore upon the 
question of whether the parties intended the signed docu-
ment to displace the oral agreement, states: 
"'In deciding upon this intent, the chief and 
most satisfactory index for the judge is found 
in the circumstance whether or not the particular 
element of the alleged extrinsic negotiation is 
dealt with at all in the writing. If it is mention~d 
or dealt with in the writing, then presumably the 
writing was 1neant to repre.sent all of the trans-
action on that element; if it is not, then probably 
the writing was not intended to en1body that ele-
ment of the negotiation.' " 
In this case there is no 1nention in the writing cover-
ing the oral .agremnent to provide that under the contract 
of July 14, 1954, only 66,666 shares would be delivered. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
RESPONDENT TO REDUCE A .CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA-
TION WITHOUT CONSIDERATION. 
Appellant argues that the Court was 1n error in 
allowing the oral modification of the Contract of July 
14, 1954, to provide that the 66,666 shares need not be 
delivered if the $1000.00 was returned within a re.ason-
able time instead of within ten days. He argues that a 
con.sideration is required for the modification of the 
agreement. 
This is no doubt true of executory contracts, but 
in this case, as respondent has point,ed out several times 
alre.ady in his Brief, appellant accepted the lesser amount 
of stock and by furnishing an Offering Circular to each 
prospective purcha.ser of stock he not only evidenced 
his compl'ete acceptance of the modification, but in effect 
made a contract with the purchasers of stock to the 
effect that if they made a purchase of stock, that the 
value of their stock would not be diluted by the delivery 
to him or anyone else of additional shares of preorganiza-
tion stock for which no more money would be paid. 
The law on the matter of the requirement of a con-
sideration for an executed modifying .agreement is stated 
in 17 C.J.S. 861, Sec. 376, under the heading of Contracts-
Modification-Consideration, as follows: 
"While consideration is necessary to support a 
modification of a contract, a new consideration 
has been held unnecessary at least where the 
contract is executory or the modification merely 
explan.atory, and an executed modified agreement 
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will not be disturbed for want of consideration 
.... Where a modified agreement has been fully 
executed it will not be disturbed for want of con-
sideration and there are cases which hold that 
where one party has performed a modified agree-
ment to such an extent that it would work a fraud 
or injury on the other party to repudiate it, the 
modified contract will be sustained." 
Included in the cases cited in support of this general 
rule of law is a Utah case directly in point-N ordfors v. 
Knight, 60 Pac.(2d) 1115, 1118, 90 Utah 114. In that case 
plaintiff contracted to purchase certain lands from de-
fendant for the sum of $3500.00, payable $1750.00 cash up-
on the execution of the agreement, and $1750.00 at a later 
date. Before the S'econd payment became due plaintiff 
informed defendant that he would not pay $1750.00 be-
cause the property was not worth the purchase price, 
but he would pay $1250.00, which defendant agreed to 
accept. Subsequently plaintiff sued defendant stating 
that not all the land agreed to be delivered ·was delivered, 
and defendant counterclailned for $500.00, alleging that 
there was no consideration for the reduction of the bal-
ance of the purchase price from $1750.00 to $1250.00. 
The Court found that the payment of $1250.00 was made, 
at which time plaintiff accmnpanied defendant to the 
hank and received the contract, deed and abstract of 
title, and that no further claim was n1ade until the suit 
was brought over the boundary lines, at which time de-
fendant counterclain1ed for the additional $500.00. The 
Court found against defendant on his counterclaim. The 
Court stated: 
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"We think the evidence fully sustains the findings 
of the court. It may be conceded that as a gen-
eral rule a consideration is necessary to sus-
tain a contract modifying .an existing contract, 
but as stated in 13 C.J. 592, Sec. 607, 'where a 
modified agreement has been fully executed it 
will not be disturbed for a want of consideration.' 
See, also, Vigelius v. Vigelius, 169 Washington 
190, 13 Pac. (2d) 425; Davis v. Culmer, 221 Mo. 
App. 1037, 295 S.W. 803. The modifying agree-
ment in this case was fully performed, .and the 
deed, abstract and original agreement delivered 
to plaintiff by defendant himself. The deal was 
finally closed and considered closed by both par-
ties for over two years. The whole transaction 
showed an intent, which w.as fully and completely 
carried out, to perforn1 and accept performance 
under the new agreen1ent and a mutual abandon-
ment of the old agreement. It must follow that 
defendant, under the facts of this case, cannot 
now claim that the agreement thus performed is 
a nullity for want of consideration." 
Other recent cases on this subject to the same effect 
Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lbr. 
Co., 62 Ida. 683, 115 Pac. (2d) 401; 
Meyer v. Strom, 37 Wash. (2d) 818, 226 Pac. (2d) 
218; 
Julian v. Gold, 214 Cal. 7 4, 3 Pac. (2d) 1009. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PER-
MIT MR. ELGGREN TO TESTIFY AS TO CONVERSATIONS 
WITH APPELLANT ·CONCERNING STATEMENTS MADE 
IN THE OFFERING CIRCULAR RELATIVE TO PRE-OR-
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GANIZATION STOCK TO WHICH APPELLANT OR REED 
P. LARSON WERE ENTITLED. 
The Court struck the testimony of Mr. Elggren upon 
the theory that Mr. Elggren was acting as attorney for 
plaintiff, and that any communications made were con-
fidential and privileged. 
Mr. Elggren testified that he was not employed by 
Mr. Reed, but that he was acting as attorney for Wyo-
ming Uranium Company in the preparation of the Offer-
ing Circular ( R. 35). 
If Mr. Elggren had been acting for I\Ir. Reed, the 
testimony would still be admissible. It is only as to con-
fidential communications that the attorney may not 
testify. 
As stated in McCormick on Evidence, page 190: 
"It is the essence of the privilege that it is limited 
to those communications as to which the client 
either expressly made confidential or which he 
would reasonably assume under the circumstances 
would be understood by the attorney as so in-
tended. . . Wherever the n1atters communicated 
to the attorney are intended by the client to bB 
made public or revealed to third persons, ob-
viously the element of confidentiality is wanting." 
1 n this matter all conversation.s between ~Ir. Elggren 
and Mr. Reed which were the subject of the testimony 
which was not adn1itted had to do with the amount of 
stock to whirh Thlr. Reed, either in his own name or in 
the name of Dr. Reed P. Larson, w.as entitled so that 
the mnount thereof could be stated in the Offering Circu-
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lar and the information communicated through the Offer-
ing Circular to every prospective purchaser of Wyoming 
Uranium Company stock. Nothing could be farther from 
the thought that this was a confidential communication 
a.s it was intended to be made public, and, therefore, 
under the law as stated above, it should not have been 
excluded. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER 
A FINDING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ORAL AGREE-
MENT OF APPELLANT TO ACCEPT 166,666 SHARES WAS 
FULLY EXgCUTED. 
The Court in rendering his order for judgment 
stated: 
"It is the further holding of the Court that the 
contract dated July 14, 1954, was modified by 
a subsequent oral agreement which abrogated 
the ten day provision and permitted the $1000.00 
to be returned within a reasonable time, and the 
$1000.00 was returned within a reasonable time 
and plaintiff at the same time in the oral agree-
ment agreed to accept 66,666 shares of stock under 
the agreement of July 14th, as is right, and that 
agreement was executed by the plaintiff and de-
fendant." (R. 71) (Italics ours) 
By oversight the Finding upon this matter was 
omitted in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
It is true that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law were prepared by Counsel for respondent. How-
ever, the law imposes the burden upon the Court to make 
full findings upon all1natters additional. 
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POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER 
A FINDING TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT DE-
LIVERED 166,666 SHARES TO APPELLANT WHICH HE 
ACCEPTED AND WAIVED CLAIM TO ANY ADDITIONAL 
SHARES. 
As a Third Affirmative Defense respondent alleged 
that during the months of 1\iarch, 1955, and November, 
1955, respondent delivered the stock agreed to be de-
livered under the agreements of July 14, 1954, and July 
29, 1954, in the amount of 166,666 shares and the same 
were accepted by appellant and appellant waived claim 
to any additional share.s of the capital stock of Wyoming 
Uranium Corporation. 
Respondent has set forth above the evidence that 
appellant accepted the 166,666 shares and made no claim 
for the additional 66,666 shares for a long time there-
after, during which time the stock had risen in value 
from 3c to 19lf2c a share. 
Under the subject of Contracts the matter of Waiver 
is discus.sed in 12 Am. Jur., 918, Section 354: 
"Strict and full performance of a contract by 
one party may be waived by the other party as 
a condition precedent may be waived by the party 
in whose favor they are 1nade." 
As stated in Woodard v. Speck, 117 Okla. 27, 245 
Pac. 630, .as Syllabus 2 to the case: 
"Where there has been a breach of contract for 
sale of land sufficient to cause forfeiture and 
party entitled thereto either expressly or by con-
duct waives forfeiture or acquiesces in breach he 
will be precluded in enforcing forfeiture." 
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The law is that the fact of agreement may be im-
plied from a course of conduct in accordance with its 
existence as stated in Smith v. Washburn, 54 Ida. 659, 
34 Pac.(2d) 969: ~ r: c.d4. f't.J : .!~~ J? t. 
"So assent may be i~lied from .acts of one party 
in accordance with the terms of the change pro-
posed by the other and assent to new terms of 
performance even if invalid as a contract will 
serve as an estoppel excusing what otherwise 
would be a default." 
In the case at bar, if it were concluded that the or.al 
modification of the agree1nent of July 14, 1954, were 
inadmissible, still the evidence is before the court that 
respondent told appellant that the $1000.00 would be 
returned within a reasonable time instead of within ten 
days, and that nothing would be p.aid to appellant for 
said $1000.00. It is not necessary under the law as stated 
above to establish that there was a complete parol agree-
ment to such proposition. The fact is that .appellant per-
formed in accordance with that statement of the respond-
ent and should be estopped after the contract was fully 
executed in accordance with said statement of respond-
ent to claim the additional sh.ares. 
See also Condit and Conser v. Moon Motor Co., 129 
Ore. 161, 276 Pac. 265, in which the Court cites Williston 
on Contracts, Sec. 90, as follows: 
"'Assent m.ay be indicated by acts ·as well as by 
words.'" 
In this c3cse, as has before been stated, appellant 
distributed Offering Circulars which stated that the 
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stock was given for $2500.00 in the amount of 166,666 
shares, and as respondent testified : 
"That is what we put in the Offering Circular and 
the stock then was 3c a share and it wasn't until 
a year and a half later when the stock went up 
to 20c a share that he said he would hold me to 
that ten-day clause in there." 
In this case an estoppel or waiver is particularly 
appropriate under the circumstances as stated by re-
spondent. 
SUMMARY 
Appellant has received stock at 1¥2c per share for 
.all moneys paid by him. It was the intent of the agree-
ments between respondent and appellant that he should 
purchase stock at 1 ¥2c per share. Respondent delivered 
the stock on that basi.s and appellant accepted it in full 
execution of the contract. By the Offering Circular ap-
pellant in effect represented to his customers that no 
more stock was due to him. To require respondent to 
pay 19¥2c a share for stock which was worth 3c a share 
when the agreement was executed would work a gross 
inequity. Justice has been accorded appellant. 
Respondent submits that the Trial Court was right 
in its rulings and its decision, and that the appeal should 
be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. GRANT IVERSON 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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